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The past five years have seen a virtual explosion of learned historical and 
epistemological studies of the history of probability and statistics: [Stigler 1986, 
Porter 1986, Kruger et al. 1987, Daston 1988, Gigerenzer 1989, Hald 1990], to 
name but a few. Hacking was and remains part of this intellectual collective 
inspired by Lorenz Kruger. As an Anglo-American analytical philosopher with 
somewhat renegade attractions to French epistemo-archeology and deconstruc- 
tion, however, Hacking offers a very nontraditional and idiosyncratic account in 
the present book when compared to his earlier oeuvre [Hacking 19751. 
Although very little is said anywhere about formal mathematical concepts of 
probability, Hacking generally succeeds in identifying and elucidating metaphysi- 
cal, epistemological, and logical issues which underlie what he considers the 
ongoing erosion of scientific determinism following “the avalanche of printed 
numbers . . . and the new technologies . . . and bureaucracies . . . for classifying 
and enumerating” (pp. 2-3). With something of a Foucaultian perspective [Fou- 
cault 1972, 19731, Hacking seeks to examine the emergence of the roots and root- 
metaphors of what eventually became statistical information and control theory, 
decision theory and risk analysis, and operations research. He identifies his specific 
objective as that of philosophically examining the history of the statistical analysis 
of regularities in societal populations, seen as a particular menfulitt or “style” of 
reasoning in the sense of Gaston Granger [ 19681. The collection of chronologically 
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organized but loosely connected essays seeks to show the ways in which apparently 
irregular or random events were progressively brought under the control of recon- 
sidered natural and also new social laws, with the notion of chance itself increas- 
ingly becoming the conceptual centerpiece. This pride of place was previously held 
by Newtonian mechanism and its descendants, from Laplace through polyvalent 
contemporary savants like RenC Thorn [Thorn 19831. 
The author dates the clearest enunciation of the deterministic view of statistics 
and probability to Laplace’s Philosophical Essay on Probabilities [ 17951, while he 
finds the first explicit second thoughts and challenges to it in works like Bichot’s 
medical studies, which argue that organic life defies every kind of calculation. 
Almost concurrent with the French Republic and Empire’s emphasis on the use 
of rudimentary statistics and inference in quantitative medical and epidemiological 
morbidity studies, was English and German work in anatomo-politics and politico- 
arithmetic (e.g., Malthus), as well as the first demographic studies such as [Price 
1798, Sinclair 1799, Krug 18031. In Hacking’s view, the physiocratic works of 
Condorcet, the first developer of Bayesian analysis of voting procedures, marked 
the definite initiation of a recognizable body of probabilistic and statistical methods 
and applications, if not yet an identifiable academic discipline. During the early 
19th century, the two domains of probability and statistics diverged in Auguste 
Comte’s sociological-moral positivism and in the specifically mathematical focus 
of Adolphe Quetelet. This divergence notwithstanding, the approach to more 
objective formal statistics and probability in the period from 1800 to 1850 (as 
detailed in Chaps. 6-10) was still very tentative. Hacking notes the tendency 
merely to amass huge quantities of data with little quality control and frequently 
less rigorous analysis. Not uncommon for this era were scientific caricatures such 
as Quetelet’s would-be discovery that Belgian lilacs first bloom when the sum of 
the squares of the mean daily temperatures following the last frost day adds up to 
4264”C! In contrast to Thomas Kuhn’s assertion that “the road from scientific law 
to scientific measurement can rarely be travelled in the reverse direction” [Kuhn 
1979,219], Hacking argues that an explanation of the enthusiasm for measurement 
and rudimentary graphical and summary statistics, frequently of a very speculative 
nature, requires a different conception of the historical evolution of ideas. 
In trying to cover all of the areas of natural and social science which affected 
the evolution of pure and applied probability and statistics, Hacking makes not 
infrequent digressions (such as in Chap. 8 on the sociopathology of 19th-century 
suicides, and in Chaps. 19 and 20 on psychological normality) which almost obscure 
more than they illuminate. These are included as early examples of the discovery 
of apparent statistical laws which were also explained and rationalized in explicitly 
nondeterministic fashion. As the text constantly stresses, it must be recalled that 
it was precisely in such a mixed milieu that mathematicians such as Joseph Fourier 
and his student, Quetelet, further developed the incomplete generalizations of 
Bernoulli and Laplace through applications. 
To offer a sense of these applications, Chapter 10 discusses the use of statistical 
data in evaluating the efficacy of medical treatments, while Chapter 11 examines 
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Poisson’s efforts to design optimally selected and sized court trialjuries. In Chapter 
12, Hacking details Poisson’s 1837 work leading to the Law of Large Numbers, 
which, he underscores, was metamathematically poised between subjective (be- 
lief-based, inferential) and objective (frequency-, modeling-, choice-based) atti- 
tudes toward probability. Even though many of Poisson’s contemporaries vigor- 
ously argued that the Law of Large Numbers was nothing but a minor explication 
of Bernoulli’s work, no one before Chebyshev (1859) seems to have been bothered 
by the question of whether it was “really” an empirical phenomenon or a mathe- 
matical theorem. Chapter 13 also shows how Quetelet’s studies of racially repre- 
sentative average morphological traits helped not only to transform the notion of 
arithmetic mean into a recognized quantity but also to develop the measurement 
of unknown physical quantities into a measurement theory for abstract properties 
of populations (for example, the Gaussian distribution). 
Chapters 16 and 17 chronicle some of the antistatistical backlash from scientific, 
philosophical, and literary quarters. For example, Hacking addresses the seem- 
ingly contradictory thesis of Ernst Cassirer 11956, 31 that scientific determin- 
ism-as an explicit idea linked to that of causal necessity-arose only around 
1870. Although Hacking rejects the primafacie implications of Cassirer’s thesis, 
he argues that the words “determinism,” “necessity,” and “chance” did not have 
their present (nonmetaphoric) philosophical meaning until the latter part of the 
19th century. Citing the references to the French neo-Kantians, Renouvier and 
Delboeuf, in William James’s 1884 lecture “The Dilemma of Determinism” and 
James Clerk Maxwell’s later inferences against free will, Hacking finds the origins 
of a strong notion of determinism in the 1850’s in France and the 1880’s in England 
(rather than the 1870’s in Germany). 
The book next moves, in Chapter 20 and especially in Chapter 21, to a discussion 
of the belief in sui generis statistical laws as real and autonomous cosmic forces. 
Here, Hacking argues that the taming of chance hinged critically on probability 
and statistics becoming routinely servicable for explanation as well as prediction 
of scientific phenomena. He focuses on the statistical work concerning genetic 
inheritance by Galton and on the research of Karl Pearson (founder of Biometrika 
and Annals of Eugenics). Using his “quincunx” machine, Galton demonstrated 
that, if a population is normally distributed, in a second generation there will be 
a normal distribution of similar mean and dispersion in which exceptional members 
will not typically be descended from exceptional members of the prior generation. 
Pearson, particularly in his philosophical writings, considered that “correlational” 
explanations such as Galton’s practically eliminated the need for a metaphysical 
notion of causality. 
Returning to the opening theme of Chapter 1, Hacking closes this book with a 
survey of the (meta) scientifically brilliant albeit personally tormented career of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, which, in many ways, is also a summary of the later 
evolution of key concepts in the protomathematical disciplines of probability and 
statistics. He touches on Peirce’s work on accuracy in geodetic measurement and 
errors in physical observation, the nature of psychophysical regularities, and his 
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belief in an ultimately self-correcting scientific community of communicators, as 
the semiotic medium for and the arbiter of scientific (including statistical and 
probabilistic) inference. Peirce [ 1931-1935 II, 650-7001 refused the subjectivism 
of those who, like Augustus de Morgan, construed probabilities as degrees of 
belief. Denying determinism outright, Peirce explained inductive learning and 
reasoning in terms of statistical stability over a total community of “interpretants” 
[Peirce 1931-1935 V, 330-540; VII, 2161, a notion from Peirce’s semiotics that is 
far from clear in his own writing and remains a topic of considerable investigation 
[Ape1 19811. As Hacking rightly summarizes, Peirce’s pragmatistic concept of 
reality made the notion of an (asymptotically approached?) truth a strongly proba- 
bilistic matter of what is discovered over the long term in the community of 
scientific interpretants as a whole. 
For readers troubled by the often redundant, patchwork, and at times disorderly 
progress of this narrative, Hacking replies that the history of the development of 
probability and statistics was itself disorderly, and that most prior historiographical 
and philosophical models have only imposed a false systematization. In contrast 
to Stigler’s meticulously detailed study, Hacking’s book tends to underline larger 
crosscutting historical and philosophical themes. On the question of philosophical 
styles, Hacking’s prose as well as his themes are much influenced by the rather 
loose, extremal, and occasionally self-reflexively sarcastic styles of contemporary 
French philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Michel Serres, and of socio- 
philosophers of science such as Bruno Latour [ 19861. Thus, there is little philosoph- 
ically detailed discussion of what Cassirer [ I956,193ff] called the struggle between 
interpreting probabilities as either modal/empirically possible or categoric theoreti- 
cal explanations. The Taming @Chance is written in an easy and readable semi- 
technical fashion and can be read as a kind of culmination of the above-noted 
recent studies on the history of statistics and probability. Unfortunately, some of 
this material has appeared previously in a somewhat similar form [Hacking 19801, 
which diminishes the originality of the present monograph. Although it is not the 
place for a beginner to get conceptual and chronological bearings, this book has a 
definite place in university and philosophy libraries, and will offer many points for 
reconsideration and debate to mathematicians and future scholars in the history 
and philosophy of mathematics. 
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Leibniz produced a staggering amount of work in such areas as philosophy, 
law, mathematics, logic, history, linguistics, mechanics, physics, astronomy, and 
theology. The present collection gives some indication as to the scope of his 
contributions. It is just the first volume in the Leibniz-Archiv (Hannover) project 
to produce all of Leibniz’s mathematical writing. Its nearly one thousand pages 
represent his writings on certain mathematical subjects during the four years from 
1672 to 1676 which Leibniz, then in his twenties, spent in Paris. (Note that this 
does not include the extensive body of Leibniz’s work on the calculus.) Leibniz 
was the paradigmatic example of genius during a century which Whitehead called 
the “century of genius” [1889, p. viii]. While Leibniz always claimed that logic 
was the foundation of all of his ideas from theology to mathematics, he had few 
other logicians with whom he could discuss or debate his logic (the “universal 
characteristic”). In most other areas of research, however, this was far from the 
case. Leibniz may have been isolated as a logician, but as a mathematician he 
